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Paper Title: On the Feasibility of “Twofold Transformation”. Can Institutions of 
Sustainability Evolve in Transition Countries?  
Abstact: This paper aims at explaining the role and importance of the evolution of institutions 
for sustainable agri-environments during the transition process by referring to agri-
environmental problems faced in Central and Eastern European countries. A central question 
therefore is whether the required institutional arrangements for achieving sustainability in the 
area of agri-environmental resource management can be built more easily in periods of 
transition as they fill institutional gaps, or whether processes of transition make institution 
building a more difficult and far more time consuming task than previously thought. Above 
all, we want to find out, how these two processes of institution building at different scales 
affect the sustainable management of resources such as water and biodiversity in agriculture. 
It will become clear that the agri-environmental problem areas faced during transition are 
complex and dynamic and require adequate institutions both by political design and from the 
grassroots, to be developed by the respective actors involved. Transition from centrally 
planned to pluralistic systems has to be considered as a particular and in some respect non-
typical process of institutional change. Popular theories of institutional change do not 
necessarily apply. The privatisation experience from many CEE countries will serve as an 
example. Finally, we will emphasis the problem of missing or insufficient interaction between 
political actors or agencies and people in CEE countries. Substantial investments into social 
and human capital, particularly regarding informal institutions are needed for institutions of 
sustainability to evolve.  On the Feasibility of “Twofold Transformation”. 
Can Institutions of Sustainability Evolve in Transition Countries? 
Abstract 
This paper aims at explaining the role and importance of the evolution of institutions for sustainable agri-
environments during the transition process by referring to agri-environmental problems faced in Central 
and Eastern European countries. A central question therefore is whether the required institutional 
arrangements for achieving sustainability in the area of agri-environmental resource management can be 
built more easily in periods of transition as they fill institutional gaps, or whether processes of transition 
make institution building a more difficult and far more time consuming task than previously thought. 
Above all, we want to find out, how these two processes of institution building at different scales affect the 
sustainable management of resources such as water and biodiversity in agriculture. It will become clear that 
the agri-environmental problem areas faced during transition are complex and dynamic and require 
adequate institutions both by political design and from the grassroots, to be developed by the respective 
actors involved. Transition from centrally planned to pluralistic systems has to be considered as a particular 
and in some respect non-typical process of institutional change. Popular theories of institutional change do 
not necessarily apply. The privatisation experience from many CEE countries will serve as an example. 
Finally, we will emphasis the problem of missing or insufficient interaction between political actors or 
agencies and people in CEE countries. Substantial investments into social and human capital, particularly 
regarding informal institutions are needed for institutions of sustainability to evolve.  
1 Introduction  
Institutions are sets of interrelated rules governing many aspects of social life which are 
acknowledged (or even sanctioned) by the members of society. Institutions co-ordinate 
relationships among individuals, i.e. they determine rights and duties as well as costs and 
benefits of actions. This equally applies to human relationships affected by interactions 
between the social and the ecological system, and therefore institutions also form the essential 
linkage between these systems (Goglio, 1997; Ostrom et al., 1993; Gatzweiler et al., 2001). 
Following these ideas, this paper is based on an institutional framework focussing on the 
interaction of social and ecological systems. The notion of evolution and co-evolution refers 
to the characteristics of the process of (intentional) institutional design or (non-intentional) 
institutional change as a process which is dynamic, complex and a result of co-adapting 
social and ecological systems.  
Our understanding of sustainability refers to the ways social systems interact with and relate 
to ecological systems by means of their institutions. Sustainable social or ecological systems 
are systems which can persist their integrity and functionality over time, and this dynamic 
process is accompanied by the establishment of institutions which facilitate co-adaptive 
change. A special attribute of sustainability is that both systems are interlinked and therefore 
need to sustain each other in order to sustain themselves. From a biological point of view 
sustainability means that the resource avoids extinction. In economic terms it means that 
humans avoid major disruptions and can hedge against instabilities. Causes for the 
mismanagement of natural resources tend to be associated with absent institutions or with 
mismatches among institutions. Often institutions do not exist at the appropriate scale, or they 
are ineffective because they fail to control ecosystem stocks and flows properly. Other 
reasons for scale mismatches are ineffective decision making linkages or that decisions are 
based on information aggregated at the wrong scale, even though information at the 
appropriate scale may exist. There is considerable information on ecosystems at the small 
scale. However, large-scale systems are not simply small-scale systems grown large. 
Management systems that work well in handling traditional resource problems at local level 
can produce destructive results when applied to global system scales. Similarly, if local The Evolution of Institutions of Sustainability in Transition 
resource management systems are superseded by national or international regulations, local 
ecosystems frequently suffer mismanagement (Costanza et al., 2001).  
Only to a certain degree we are able to intentionally design both social and ecological systems 
due to the complexity of the desired outcomes. Institutional framing conditions supporting 
and allowing for the evolution of local resource management institutions belong to this type 
of institutions which can (and should) be designed intentionally. However, as the nature of 
ecosystem characteristics is also stochastic and unpredictable (to a certain degree), the final 
match between ecosystem structures and appropriate governance structures will only occur, if 
at least some of these institutional innovations are given adequate scope of action to evolve 
spontaneously and unintentionally. Some institutions regulating human action evolve without 
conscious human design and maintain themselves without any formal ‘machinery’ for 
enforcing them (Sugden, 1989). ‘People do things in a certain way because that’s what they 
have been always doing and it has proven to be the right way to do things’. The evolution of 
such institutions as a response to ecosystem specificity consists of processes of co-adaptation 
whereby structures are progressively modified to give better performance. These evolutionary 
processes of co-adaptation can only work along the lines of communication, information, 
feedback and response. For these processes of co-adaptation to be successful political actors 
should care for both reliable framing conditions by some basic rules and arrangements and 
sufficient scope for learning-by-doing and self-governance. 
The paper is organised as follows (see also Gatzweiler and Hagedorn, 2002): By presenting a 
framework for the analysis of institutions of sustainability in agriculture, we will explain 
some basic characteristics of institution building. Thereafter, we will show some important 
particularities and problems which become evident if we understand the process of change in 
transition countries as a special process of institutional design or change, by providing 
examples from the privatisation experience in some CEE countries. Then we will point out 
some essential problems which are likely to occur when both institutional innovation towards 
sustainability and the fundamental institutional changes typical for transition countries are 
supposed to take place at the same time. Finally, this leads us to a brief discussion on the role 
of public participation in transition countries. 
2 Property Rights Regimes and Governance Structures for Agri-environmental 
Sustainability 
Of course, institutions focussing on agri-environmental sustainability are a part of the system 
of ecological-economic co-evolution with mutual adjustment mechanisms. The forces driving 
their (non-intentional) evolution or the criteria relevant for their (intentional) design can be 
derived from the framework developed above. Accordingly, institutional change regarding 
agri-environmental co-ordination, i.e. mainly the property rights regimes and governance 
structures in this area, can be understood as a response to technological, ecological and 
economic factors, on the one hand, and societal, behavioural and political influences, on the 
other (Table 1). For structuring and analysing the relationships and the interplay between 
these factors, an explorative concept is necessary. Institutional change in the area of resource 
protection and agri-environmental co-ordination is related on the following groups of 
phenomena (see, for a more comprehensive description, Hagedorn, 2000a; Hagedorn, et al., 
2002a): 
(1)  Which institutional arrangements arise, that depends on the features and implications of 
the transactions related to nature and the ecosystem (Box 1). This is mainly influenced 
by the physical properties and material transformations with which environmental goods 
and bads, benefits and damages are associated (example: leaching of nitrates into the 
groundwater on sandy soils). Technological innovation and structural change lead to 
permanent changes of these properties and transformations.  
  2The Evolution of Institutions of Sustainability in Transition 
 
Box 1: Features of Transactions Affecting the Natural Environment and 
Ecological Systems 
(1)  Excludability of actors from access to environmental goods and exclusion costs 
(2)  Rivalry among the users of environmental, goods, i.e. “subtractability” in 
common-pool resources  
(3)  Asset specificity induces opportunistic behaviour:  
site specificity, capital specificity, specific knowledge  
(4)  Separability is often low due to jointness of production of environmental goods  
(5)  Frequency of transactions: specialised governance structures, economies of 
scale and learning by doing  
(6)  Uncertainty causes transaction costs for measuring and monitoring and gathering 
adequate information  
(7)  Complexity, combined with insufficient scientific knowledge, provokes 
opportunistic behaviour  
(8)  Heterogeneity and variability, i.e. “site and situation specificity” makes 
standardised regulation inefficient 
























(2)  Simultaneously, institutional change depends on the characteristics and objectives of the 
actors involved (Box 2) in those transactions. This is not only true for individual actors 
whose values, interests and resources to exert influence (power) are very different, but 
also for groups of individuals like communities using organisations and networks to 
shape institutions according to their objectives (example: farmers who cause nitrate 
leaching by high nitrogen fertilisation and unfavourable crop rotation without catch 
crops).  
(3)  The changes in institutions, which result from the two main categories of driving forces 
mentioned above, affect the design and distribution of property rights on ecosystem 
functions (DeGroot, 1992) (Box 3), or more precisely, on those cost and benefit streams 
which can be attributed to natural capital and ecosystem services (example: trade-offs 
between reducing nitrogen balances by means of lower fertilisation and intercropping 
and decline in gross margins). The property rights can be defined for numerous 
ecological properties of a physical piece of nature, each of them related to particular 
costs and benefits (and for each of these differentiated rights components, the 
institutional design of the right or duty can differ: private, collective and state property 
regimes or open access). They tend to become more and more differentiated, because 
they do not only apply to physical goods like land, but also to various dimensions and 
many details of land use relevant to environmental protection and sustainable agriculture, 
e.g., the right to decide on crop rotation. 
(4)  Necessarily, such changes in property rights on nature components are accompanied by 
corresponding changes in governance structures (Box 4), mainly for two reasons: first, 
property rights on nature components, like other property rights, must be supervised and 
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sanctioned to become effective instead of only being formal in nature; and secondly, the 
actors can only make use of their rights and entitlements and will only fulfil their duties 
and obligations, if transactions are organised and co-ordinated (example: farmers will 
only comply with fertilising restrictions and cropping prescriptions if a adequately 
working system of measuring and monitoring activities, information and administration, 
positive and/or negative incentives, i.e. of subsidies and/or penalties, exists).  
 
Box 2: Characteristics of Actors Involved in Agri-environmental Co-ordination
(1)  Values and beliefs of the actors and their particular attitudes and perceptions of
agri-environmental issues  
(2)  Reputations for reliability and trustworthiness are important for the credibility
of their commitments  
(3)  Resources for influencing agri-environmental strategies at the regional and
local levels, i.e. by direct participation  
(4)  Resources for influencing political decision making at higher than the regional
level, in which land users cannot participate directly  
(5)  Information and knowledge, and capacities for acquiring, processing,
retaining and using knowledge and information; asymmetric information  
(6)  “Actor’s method of action selection”: maximising homines oeconomici,
constrained maximisers with bounded rationality, or fallible learners  





















(5)  Similar to the property rights regimes mentioned above, governance structures are also 
very differentiated (markets, e.g., tradable pollution quotas, hierarchies such as 
environmental bureaucracies, hybrid forms like contractual relations, e.g., stewardship 
contracts, horizontal non-market co-ordination, i.e. co-operation and participation, 
knowledge and information systems, formal and informal networks, methods and 
infrastructure for measuring, monitoring and evaluating environmental damages and 
benefits, e.g., systems of laboratories, rules and procedures for conflict resolution, 
regulation of liability, incentives to promote innovation and learning, etc.). They may 
include self-organised co-ordination (e.g., environmental co-operatives) and govern-
mental regulations (e.g., environmental bureaucracies), and they are not only related to 
the implementation of environmental instruments, but also to decision making on 
environmental policies which takes place on the different levels of co-operative 
federalism (community, region, province, national, EU, international).  
For the last point mentioned above, the political economy behind the process of joint 
implementation and decision making in a federal system has to be taken into account. This 
may produce scale problems similar to those emphasised by Constanza et al. (2001): Self-
interested or insufficiently informed political actors may be reluctant or unable to create 
missing linkages between scales and to gather information at appropriate scales. 
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For exploring and explaining these four groups of variables in more detail, we surely can 
make use of approaches like New Institutional Economics and the Institutional Analysis of 
Natural Resources (e.g., Richter and Furobotn, 1996; North, 1992; Williamson, 1996; Ostrom, 
1990; 1998; 1999; Bromley, 1991; 1996; 1998; Loehmann and Kilgour, 1998; Berkes and 
Folke, 1998). Studies available on environmental co-operation and participation are available 
as an additional source of theoretical concepts and empirical information (see, e.g., OECD, 
1998; Bahner, 1996; Zimmer, 1991; 1994a,b; Campbell, 1998; Fisk, Hesterman and 
Thorborn; 1998; van Woerkum and Aarts, 1998; Woodhill and Roeling, 1998; and the 
contributions to the 64
th EAAE Seminar published in Hagedorn, 2002). However, detailed 
empirical research of this sort is still in an initial phase, and much has to be done: The number 
of characteristics of the human actor, features of transactions and types of rules affecting 
organisational arrangements which affect the capacity of human actors to manage 
environmental resources is very large, and we are far from complete knowledge about these 




















Box 3: Property Rights on Ecosystem Functions 
Related to Agriculture 
(1)  Benefit streams or cost components connected with physical goods: differentiated 
“property rights on nature components”  
(2)  Property rights separately defined for numerous ecological properties of a physical 
piece of nature: private, collective, state property regimes, open access  
(3)  Transaction costs for defining and establishing property rights can be prohibitively 
high, but may change, for example, by technological progress  
(4)  Structure of property rights: selecting the most efficient right holder, the “residual 
claimant”, deciding on control rights, “bundling of rights” or “divided property”  
(5)  Bundling property rights on nature components favours decentralisation, dividing 
rights results in centralisation and affects motivation and participation  
(6)  Rights cannot be used and duties cannot be fulfilled in an isolated way in 
ecological systems, rights and duties are conditional upon the use and fulfilment of 
other rights and duties respectively 
In spite of this, we can draw the conclusion that the property rights regimes and governance 
structures necessary for achieving sustainability will not be simple. As they need to evolve in 
response to the complex, diverse and dynamic nature of the characteristics of the social and 
ecological system, it appears logical that there can be no single type of rules, norms, rights 
and governance which would guarantee sustainable development. Bowels and Gintis (2000) 
support this view by stating that well-designed institutions make different governance 
structures (e.g., markets, states, communities and co-operative structures) compliments, not 
substitutes.  
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How can we adjust our research concepts to the fact that both property rights regimes and 
governance structures are in a process of change that makes them more complex and diverse? 
As far as governance structures are concerned, the concept of polycentricity may contribute to 
an adequate solution. Polycentricity is created by those who participate in it. It is an order 
which allows communities to organise different kinds of public goods at different scales of 
aggregation with different and overlapping jurisdictions. It cannot be sustained unless the The Evolution of Institutions of Sustainability in Transition 
relevant actors make use of their full range of alternatives. Polycentric order must be 
grounded in mutually supportive institutional arrangements in the economic, legal, constitu-
tional and political realms. Markets for private goods are needed to provide incentives for 
efficient production. The producers and providers of public goods and services must have 
some assurance that their efforts to provide those goods and services to various communities 
are legally and economically recognised. For polycentric orders to operate there must be 
correspondence between the beneficiaries of public goods and services and those who pay 
for/provide them (McGinnis, 1999). Polycentricity provides an ideal setting for the co-
production and co-management of public goods and services by members of communities. It 
offers an alternative to the passive expectations people have towards political authorities. 
Polycentricity may be a helpful concept for solving the agri-environmental problems faced 
during transition as it enables to connect the loose ends of the requirements for sustainable 
agri-environments identified later in this paper. This means to establish a link between self-
governance of citizens and their decentralised institutional choice to the decision-making 
procedures and implementation capacities of national and EU policy makers. 
 
Box 4: Governance Structures for Regional or Local  
Agri-environmental Co-ordination 
“New Institutional Economics”:  
•  Markets 
•  Hierarchies 
•  Hybrid forms 
“Institutions of Sustainability”: 
•  Strategies to improve reflexivity  
•  Self-organisation and participation  
•  Interest harmonisation and conflict regulation 
•  Concepts for innovation and learning 
“Agri-environmental governance structures”: 
(1)  Market solutions like auctions or tradable quotas 
(2) Organisations  like  environmental bureaucracies 
(3)  Contractual relations, e.g. stewardship contracts 
(4)  Horizontal non-market co-ordination, particularly co-operation and 
participation  
(5)  Knowledge and information systems, formal and informal networks 
(6)  Methods and infrastructure for measuring, monitoring and evaluation, e.g. 
laboratories 
(7)  Rules and procedures for conflict resolution, distribution of costs and benefits, 
liability 























3 Particularities of Institutional Change in Transition Countries 
As a matter of fact, the process of institution building for sustainable resource use is affected 
by the particular procedures and problems arising from the process of transforming the 
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political and economic system. Findings from in three CEE Countries presented by the KATO 
privatisation studies (Milczarek, 2000; Hanisch, 2000; Schlüter, 2000) have led to the 
following results (see also Hagedorn, 2000b): 
1.  “Efficiency and competition” as compared to “distribution and conflict resolution” and 
“ideology and mental models” are not the main driving forces of privatisation.  
2.  The process of privatisation should no longer be conceived of as “privatisation” according 
to its theoretical understanding as establishing merely private property rights.  
3.  Shared mental models, innovation concepts, learning processes and access to networks, to 
human and to social capital are important mechanisms for institutional change.  
Efficiency could be a driving force of privatisation, because this does not necessarily mean 
inventing new institutions but just implementing a transfer of institutions. As a consequence, 
the Theory of Exchange and Competitive Selection as an efficiency-oriented explanation for 
institutional change might be applicable (Knight, 1992: 106). This approach includes 
competitive pressure as a selection mechanism for efficient institutions. However, the KATO 
privatisation studies (Milczarek, 2000; Hanisch, 2000; Schlüter, 2000) provide only little 
support for this approach. In contrast, the Theory of Bargaining and Distribution considers 
social institutions “as a by-product of strategic conflict over substantive social outcomes” 
(Knight, 1992: 107). As pointed out in detail by Hanisch (2000) and Schlüter (2000), this 
theory focuses on social interaction between actors seeking to achieve their distributional 
objectives. This is influenced by resource asymmetries of actors, credibility of their 
commitment, individual risk aversion, time preferences, etc. This approach has primarily been 
applied to decentralised institutional change, but most of its components also seem to be 
relevant to institutions which are centrally designed and are also treated by the Public Choice 
Theory of Institutional Change (Weimer, 1997; Hagedorn, 1991; 1996a,b; 1999). 
However, these observations also show that the process of privatisation driven by the desire 
of groups of actors having unequal power resources to appropriate “a piece of the cake” often 
took place in a way that cannot be considered “efficient” for society. This contradicts a 
conception popular in economics that associates efficiency with private property rights and 
analogously suggests that “privatisation” in the sense of merely establishing private property 
rights is equivalent to increasing efficiency.  
Property rights theory is often misunderstood as an approach explaining the definition and 
distribution of disposition rights focussing on physical entities (Hagedorn, 2000a; Hagedorn 
et al., 2002). Strictly speaking, actors only attribute (positive or negative) values to a physical 
good because the right holder is favoured by benefit streams or in case of a duty is burdened 
by cost components which are connected with the physical good. A natural good, like soil, is 
usually considered to carry only one homogeneous property title. However, categories of 
property rights can be separately defined for numerous economic or ecological properties 
connected with the physical piece of nature, each of them related to particular costs and 
benefits. For each of these differentiated rights components, the institutional design of the 
right or duty can differ: private, collective and state property regimes are imaginable (or 
others, more differentiated ones), and also the absence of property rights definition and 
delineation in the sense of open access (Bromley, 1991; Ostrom, 1990). In addition, property 
rights on such attributes of natural or physical capital require adequate governance structures, 
because they must be supervised and sanctioned to become effective instead of only 
remaining formal in nature.  
In other words, concepts of privatisation are only complete and consistent if  
•  all main attributes of a physical or natural object are subjected either to private property 
rights or other property rights regimes (or combinations) if these are superior, and   
  7The Evolution of Institutions of Sustainability in Transition 
•  governance structures covering each component of this bundle of rights are developed, 
not neglecting the required societal, political and administrative structures for decision 
making, participation and implementation. 
The KATO privatisation studies (Milczarek, 2000; Hanisch, 2000; Schlüter, 2000) provide 
many examples for the problems which arise if decision makers follow the above-mentioned 
misconception of privatisation neglecting property rights regimes and governance structures 
that are not private. For example, in the Czech Republic private farmers are sanctioned in 
order to keep their competitiveness and their reputation on the land market low, in Bulgaria 
land, machine services and the processing industry is monopolised by some actors, and the 
social situation of former state farm workers in Poland deteriorated. The nature of this 
problem may be even better illustrated by the experience that privatisation concepts usually 
neglect environmental protection and ecological sustainability (Lütteken and Hagedorn, 
1999). Exploitation of soil fertility and destruction of irrigation equipment as well as 
degradation of drainage systems during the process of restitution, privatising large livestock 
units without regulating pollution by manure, etc. show that property rights on nature 
attributes or ecosystem functions and corresponding governance structures are given low 
priority in institutional reforms.  
When the centrally planned economies collapsed, the shared mental models which had been 
developed during the socialist system could no longer fulfil its tasks. Individuals and groups 
depend on meaningful mental models for the purpose of reducing complexity (North, 1990: 
24). As a consequence, people were seeking for new cognitive schemata to understand and to 
explain the world which had changed very much for them. In particular at the beginning of 
the transformation period, when the system in transition was characterized by a high degree of 
insecurity, reduction of complexity was urgently needed. Since this basic function of shared 
mental models is of major relevance in this confusing situation, ideologies have played an 
important role in transition countries. Although in early stages of the transformation process 
society as a whole may not have arrived at sufficiently stable shared mental models yet, they 
may already exist within certain groups, which then can make use of their common 
understanding of problems for lowering transaction costs of decision making and for 
facilitating achievement of their particular group objectives. As communication and 
consensus building is easier and requires less resources within such groups, they become 
more powerful than others. Another source of gaining power in the privatisation process was 
the ability of some actors to shape people’s shared mental models in the bargaining process 
regarding new institutional arrangements.  
The above-mentioned privatisation studies have shown that there obviously is a variety of 
institutional choices for problems of institutional change in general and for transition in 
particular. However, if actors and groups do not know about the solutions, lack creativity for 
finding them, do not have sufficient resources to develop and to discuss innovations, cannot 
communicate new institutional concepts in order to arrive at joint conceptions of the 
problems, and are not able to organise collective action and participation of stakeholders, then 
the pure fact that such solutions might exist is of little practical use. Collective learning 
processes combined with the evolution of new shared mental models seem to play a 
fundamental role for institutional innovation. 
The empirical evidence from privatisation in post socialist countries mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs, e.g., the misconception of what ‘privatisation’ should be, show the 
importance of the wider social context of property regulations. There is particular evidence of 
what Hann (2000) calls the ‘tragedy of the privates’ in post-socialist countries privatisation 
was often carried out under consultation of Western advisers with a rather narrow economic 
understanding of private property and with a strategy of ‘privatise now and then let market 
competition prevail’. Neo-liberalism and privatisation have been prominent in the recipes 
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offered to the ex-socialist countries. This ethnocentric understanding of property relations (the 
‘European dichotomy’, either private or collective) continues to dominate popular academic 
thinking about property in the ages of the cold war and after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Hann, 2000).  
How helpful is this ‘mental model’ of privatisation in explaining the new social patterns of 
the first post-socialist decade? Probably it played an important role shortly after the collapse 
of the centrally planned economies for reducing insecurity and uncertainty but presumably it 
does not help very much. In their contrasting ways, the simplifications of the liberal models 
(privileging economic performance and private ownership) and the socialist models 
(privileging politic, social justice and collective ownership) cannot do justice to the actually 
prevailing complexity and social, legal, political and economical embeddedness of property 
relations in all social systems. Studying the change of institutions in countries in transition 
must therefore include the enhanced rights and entitlements of not only private, but all types 
of property rights regimes in these wider domains. The same applies to the heterogeneity of 
governance structures.  
For these reasons, regardless the framing conditions of the political system, governments 
should provide sufficient scope of action and adequate incentives for institutional diversity to 
evolve instead of imposing organisational structures which may not match local 
circumstances, because the diversity of ecological functions, which require a very specific 
response from the people involved, are not adequately predictable at other levels of society 
than at the local level. This does not mean that institution building for sustainable resource 
use can evolve without favourable framing conditions at the policy level. However, transition 
and accession policies too often neglect the potentials of institutions outside of state 
bureaucracy (e.g., networks, co-operatives, new forms of associations, mechanisms of 
learning, monitoring and communication). If successful strategies are to be put into practice, 
political instruments will hardly be adequate and useful if the institutional choices made by 
the people are overlooked (Hagedorn, 2002; Hagedorn et al., 2002). 
4 Special Problems of Building Institutions of Sustainability in Transition Countries 
The previous sections have given some explanations why institutional innovation towards 
sustainability is a very special, complex and not completely predictable process (section 2), 
and that the fundamental institutional changes taking place in the transition countries also 
have its own particularities (section 3). As a consequence, the question arises as to what 
happens if we want to achieve both simultaneously. Is it reasonable to organise such a 
“double transformation” at the same time? Let us assume that it is feasible provided that we 
take into account the following problems that are likely to arise: 
•  In the transformation situation, the actors, e.g., farm managers or agricultural bureaucrats, 
seek opportunities to secure their living and to prepare for a new or continued carrier. To 
achieve this objective, acquisition of private property rights which provide access to high 
individual benefits from entitlements and cause only low costs from duties is given 
priority. Privatised land, machines or cattle belong to this category of assets powerful 
actors aim at and are able to appropriate, as pointed out in the previous section. In other 
words, there is a high incentive intensity for institutional change regarding the distribution 
of private property rights. 
•  The next aspect refers to the effectiveness of property rights. Developing appropriate 
governance structures for the profitable use of private property rights is in many cases 
easier than it is for non-private property rights. Admittedly, establishing markets, e.g., for 
meat or vegetables, requires considerable innovation and investment, for example, in 
marketing co-operatives and processing factories, but this is driven by private interests.  
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•  In contrast, governance structures for making effective non-private property rights related 
to sustainable resource use and agri-environmental sustainability is much more difficult 
and costly. The first, general reason for this is that the political and administrative system 
is in a stage of fundamental reform
1 and still has to develop those capacities of decision 
making and implementation which democratic societies need to work properly. Secondly, 
and this may be even more important, these governance structures are every costly in 
terms of social capital (e.g., for consensus building), human capital (e.g., for sustainable 
farming practices), and physical capital (e.g., for building laboratories to control 
environmental standards). Probably, these investments in all three types of capital imply a 
large proportion of dedicated assets with a high degree of specificity. 
•  Due to these obstacles of implementation and enforcement, including requirements such 
as monitoring, information, communication, participation, etc., the incentive intensity for 
non-private property rights is much lower than for private property rights which are more 
attractive because they will be more or sooner effective in the transition phase. However, 
there is a second reason for this. Property rights on ecological attributes of the nature 
components are often duties causing negative income effects, for example, if nitrogen 
inputs have to be reduced. People in transition countries whose income are often low (and 
sometimes have even declined in the nineteenth) refuse to accept this, and limited state 
budgets do not allow for paying compensation for income losses from environmental 
measures. 
•  In addition, it appears not only less attractive, but also less necessary to care for insti-
tutions of sustainability in the transition period. After 1990, the abolition of input 
subsidies and the drop of demand for agricultural products (domestic and external) 
resulted in an unfavourable ratio of input and output prices. As a consequence, both the 
use of chemical inputs and the production output were declining. Thus, the political 
changes in 1989/90 and the collapse of the economy reduced the pressure on the 
environment and gave nature a “chance to rest”. However, the low use of potentially 
harmful inputs also reduces the motivation to design institutions and policies for 
sustainability. After agriculture will have been restructured, the level of input use is likely 
to increase again leading to growing environmental pollution. In other words, rules for 
sustainability and corresponding environmental policies appear to be unnecessary in the 
short run, although they will be urgently needed in the long run. They may find them-
selves in a “transformation trap”. After the main period of institutional innovation has 
passed, it may be very difficult to change the rules and arrangements again in favour of 
sustainability. 
•  The importance of this lack of motivation may be reinforced by the fact that the 
preferences of people and politicians are not very much oriented towards environmental 
protection and sustainable resource use. They simply ‘have other problems’ in the difficult 
phase of transition such as low incomes, declining social security, lack of political 
stability, threats to social peace, ethnic unrest, etc. 
•  Since environmental protection was not given high priority in socialist societies, values 
and attitudes are not primarily oriented towards sustainability. The cognitive schemata or 
mental models of citizens and politicians are still in a process of integrating these aspects. 
The same is true for the knowledge system. Given the outstanding relevance of cognitive 
schemata or mental models for real institutional change, as substantiated by the results of 
the above-mentioned KATO Studies, this may be one of the most important obstacle 
against institutional change towards sustainability. 
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Box 5: Agri-environmental Problems and Institutions in Countries in Transition 
 
Bulgaria: The amount of water used for irrigation in the Plovdiv region has declined sharply
over the past decade. The decline has been attributed to the general decline in agricultural
production and decollectivisation. Decollectivisation has led to uncertainty about the
organisations in charge of managing local-level irrigation works, which remained under com-
munal property. Decollectivisation has also implied that the state-owned irrigation company deals
with a large number and different types of agricultural producers, instead of the agricultural co-
operatives in the past. As a consequence, irrigation canals were not maintained and deteriorated,
the amount and efficiency of water use declined precipitously, and cropping structures underwent
drastic changes. 
 
Czech Republic: Bílé Karpaty has been declared a nature conservation area for its valuable
habitats and species diversity. The designation involves restrictions on farming practices that are
perceived as detrimental to biodiversity. The goal of protection has conflicted with agricultural
production in two ways. First, unclear property rights have led to land abandonment in less fertile
areas. Secondly, privatisation and expanding markets have motivated farmers to intensify
cultivation on more fertile lands. The administration of Bílé Karpaty Protected Landscape Area
has faced problems in an increasingly pluralistic society to enforce legally mandated restrictions
on farming practices and moved from a hierarchical towards a more co-operative way to deal
with local land users. 
 
Latvia: Soil fertility has declined and the area of abandoned land has increased in Latvia over the
past decade. Reduced liming has led to the acidification of agricultural soils. The decline of
drainage systems maintenance has led to the destruction of drainage systems and disturbed soil
moisture conditions. The deterioration of soil fertility has been associated with a general decrease
in agricultural production and a shift from state and collective enterprises to small-scale and
subsistence farming. As a consequence of privatisation, the farm structure has become
increasingly fragmented, agricultural land abandonment has increased, and local-level drainage
works have not been maintained properly. 
 
Poland: Agricultural land has rapidly shrunk in the surroundings of Warsaw and Olsztyn. An
increasing share of the land has been converted to housing land, reducing traditional agricultural
landscapes and changing species compositions. Land conversion has been driven by several
factors: the privatisation of previous state farm land and expansion of private rights over land, an
increasing demand for cheap land by people from Warsaw and Olsztyn, unprofitable market
conditions for agricultural products, the desire to attract non-agricultural employment
opportunities, and the hope for infrastructure improvements. County governments, empowered
under the policy of fiscal and administrative decentralisation, have displayed little interest to limit
conversion, as they expect to gain higher tax revenues after conversion. 
 
Romania: Irrigation management has fallen into disarray in Manastirea commune in the southern
part of the country. Land had been privatised in 1991 already, but water resources and irrigation
infrastructure had remained under the control of the state irrigation company. People established
an agricultural co-operative to work the land, but it did not get involved in water management.
The situation changed recently, when the state irrigation company was dissolved. With support
by the World Bank, people now want to establish a water user association for irrigation
management. 
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Finally, former communist economic and political systems usually have a deficit regarding 
decentralisation and participation. Many systems such as irrigation organisations were highly 
centralised and have to undergo fundamental transformation towards polycentricity. Similar-
ly, the autocratic political design of the communist governments tried to avoid people’s free 
participation in public affairs, what requires a process of learning and reorientation as an 
essential part of reform in those societies. Filling these gaps is particularly important for 
institutions of sustainability, because in the process of co-evolution mutual adjustment of 
ecological and social systems and the special properties of ecological systems require 
sufficient flexibility and scope for trial and error. This requires accumulation of social capital.  
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